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Hegel's Philosophy of Right
Analytical Table of Contents
Preface
p. 15
The work covers the same ground in a more detailed and systematic way than the
Encyclopaedia (1817).
p. 16
The philosophic way of advancing from one matter to another is essentially
different from every other.
p. 17
Free thought cannot be satisfied with what is given to it.
p. 18
The ethical world or the state, is in fact reason potently and permanently actualised
in self-consciousness.
p. 19
There are two kinds of laws, laws of nature and laws of right.
p. 20
The spiritual universe is looked upon as abandoned by God.
p. 21
Mr. Fries, one of the leaders of this shallow-minded host of philosophers.
p. 22
It is no surprise that the view just criticised should appear in the form of piety.
p. 23
The actual world of right and ethical life are apprehended in thought, and this
reasoned right finds expression in law.
p. 24
Philosophy should therefore be employed only in the service of the state.
p. 25
Philosophising has reduced all matter of thought to the same level, resembling the
despotism of the Roman Empire.
p. 26
Philosophy is an inquisition into the rational, and therefore the apprehension of the
real and present.
p. 27
What is rational is real and what is real is rational.
p. 28
To apprehend what
is
is the task of philosophy, because what
is
is reason.
p. 29
A half philosophy leads away from God, while a true philosophy leads to God.
p. 30
The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.
Introduction
§ 1
The philosophic science of right has as its object the idea of right.
§ 2
The science of right is a part of philosophy.
§ 3
Right is positive in general.
§ 4
The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and its origin is the will.
§ 5
[a]
The will contains the element of pure indeterminateness.
§ 6
[b]
The I is also the transition from blank indefiniteness to the distinct content and
object.
§ 7
[c]
The will is the unity of these two elements.
§ 8
(a)
The formal will as a self-consciousness which finds an outer world before it.
§ 9
(b)
This content of the will is an end.
§ 10
Only when the will has itself as an object is it also for itself.
§ 11
The will is at first only implicitly free, the natural will ... impulses, appetites,
inclinations.
§ 12
This content exists only as a multiplicity of impulses having many ways of
satisfaction..
§ 13
The will of a definite individual is not yet the content and work of its freedom.
§ 14
The finite will stands above its different impulses and the ways they are satisfied.
§ 15
Freedom of the will is, in this view of it, caprice.
§ 16
What is resolved upon and chosen the will may again give up.
§ 17
Caprice is the dialectic of impulses and inclinations manifested in their mutual
antagonism.
§ 18
Man is by nature good.
§ 19
Impulses must be freed from the form of direct subjection to nature.
§ 20
The propulsion by the universality of thought is the absolute worth of civilisation.
§ 21
Since the will has as its object, universality itself, it is the true idea.
§ 22
In the object the will has simply reverted into itself.
§ 23
The pure conception has the perception or intuition of itself as its end and reality.
§ 24
The will is universal, because in it all limitation and individuality are superseded.
§ 25
The subjective side of the will is its self-consciousness and individuality.
§ 26
The will becomes objective only by the execution of its ends.
§ 27
There is thus actualised as idea what the will is implicitly.
§ 28
Transcending the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity is the content of
the idea.
§ 29
Right, therefore, is, in general, freedom as idea.
§ 30
Right is something holy, because it is the embodiment of self-conscious freedom.
§ 31
The true process is found in the logic, and here is presupposed.
§ 32
The sequence of the conceptions is at the same time a sequence of realisations.
§ 33
The stages in the development of the idea of the absolutely free will.
SECTION ONE: Abstract Right
§ 34
The absolutely free will, when its concept is abstract, is an actuality contrasted with
the real world.
§ 35
From this point of view the subject is a person.
§ 36
(1)
'Be a person and respect others as persons.'
§ 37
(2)
The particularity of the will is present as desire, need, impulse and casual whim.
§ 38
To have a right is therefore to have only a permission.
§ 39
(3)
Personality is that which struggles to lift itself above this restriction and to give
itself reality.
§ 40
Property, Contract & Wrong.
i: Property
§ 41
A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as Idea.
§ 42
What is immediately different from free mind is a thing, something without rights.
§ 43
As the concept in its immediacy, a person is partly within himself and partly related
to it as to an external world.
§ 44
The absolute right of appropriation which man has over all 'things'.
§ 45
As free will I am an object to myself in what I possess and thereby also an actual
will.
§ 46
Common property that may be owned by separate persons is an inherently dissoluble
partnership.
§ 47
I possess my life and my body, like other things, only in so far as my will is in them.
§ 48
From the point of view of others, I am in essence a free entity in my body.
§ 49
What and how much I possess is a matter of indifference so far as rights are
concerned.
§ 50
A thing belongs to the person who happens to be the first in time to take it into his
possession.
§ 51
My inward idea and will that something is to be mine is not enough to make it my
property.
§ 52
Occupancy makes the matter of the thing my property, since matter in itself does not
belong to itself.
§ 53
Taking possession, Use and Alienation.
A: Possession
§ 54
Grasping it physically, by forming it, and by merely marking it as ours.
§ 55
[a]
Grasping a thing physically.
§ 56
[b]
Imposing a form on a thing.
§ 57
It is only through the development of his own body and mind, that man takes
possession of himself.
§ 58
[c]
To mark the thing.
B: Use
§ 59
The thing, as something negative in itself, exists only for my need.
§ 60
If I make repeated use of a product, then this transforms the grasp of the thing into a
mark.
§ 61
If I have the full use of the thing I am its owner.
§ 62
Ownership therefore is in essence free and complete.
§ 63
As full owner of the thing, I am owner of its value as well as of its use.
§ 64
I gain or lose possession of property through prescription.
C: Alienation
§ 65
The reason I can alienate my property is that it is mine only in so far as I put my will
into it.
§ 66
Those substantive characteristics which constitute my own private personality are
inalienable.
§ 67
I can alienate to someone else and I can give him the use of my abilities only for a
restricted period
§ 68
A product of my mind may turn into something external which may then be
produced by other people.
§ 69
The inventor of a thing remains the owner of the universal ways and means of
multiplying such things.
§ 70
There is no unqualified right to sacrifice one's life.
§ 71
Existence as determinate being is in essence being for another.
ii: Contract
§ 72
Contract is the contradiction that I am the owner only in so far as I cease to be an
owner.
§ 73
The concept compels me to alienate property in order that my will may become
objective to me.
§ 74
The two contracting parties are related to each other as immediate self-subsistent
persons.
§ 75
Contract of exchange.
§ 76
Gift, Real contract and Exchange.
§ 77
Value is the universal in which the subjects of the contract participate.
§ 78
The distinction between property and possession is the distinction between a
common will and its actualisation.
§ 79
In contract it is the will that the stipulation enshrines.
§ 80
A
. Gift,
B
. Exchange,
C
Completion of a Contract.
§ 81
If the particular will is explicitly at variance with the universal, this is Wrong.
iii: Wrong
§ 82
In contract the principle of rightness is posited, while its inner universality is in the
particular will of the parties.
§ 83
Non-malicious wrong, Fraud and Crime.
A: Non-Malicious Wrong
§ 84
Each may look upon the thing as his property on the particular ground on which he
bases his title.
§ 85
The sphere of civil suits at law.
§ 86
The principle of rightness arises as something kept in view and demanded by the
parties.
B: Fraud
§ 87
We have Fraud when the universal is set aside by the particular will only showing in
the situation.
§ 88
The contract is right enough so far as it is an exchange, but the aspect of implicit
universality is lacking.
§ 89
The subjective arbitrary will, opposing itself to the right, should be superseded.
C: Crime
§ 90
My will may be coerced.
§ 91
The free will cannot be coerced at all.
§ 92
Force or coercion is in its very conception directly self-destructive.
§ 93
In the world of reality coercion is annulled by coercion.
§ 94
Abstract right is a right to coerce.
§ 95
The sphere of criminal law.
§ 96
It makes a difference to the objective aspect of crime whether the will is injured
throughout its entire extent.
§ 97
Right actualised.
§ 98
Compensation.
§ 99
To penalise the criminal is to annul the crime and to restore the right.
§ 100
The criminal's action is the action of a rational being.
§ 101
The annulment of the crime is retribution.
§ 102
The annulling of crime in this sphere where right is immediate is principally
revenge.
§ 103
The demand for a justice freed from subjective interest has emerged in the course
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